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Abstract: Social enterprise is becoming an increasingly popular and profitable
venture in the United States and around the world today. In the United States, the
benefit corporation model leads this movement, offering incorporating companies
a positive image, a platform to build consumer trust, and the flexibility to pursue
social good. However, though the benefit corporation form comes with the
aforementioned branding advantages, states’ benefit corporation laws as they
currently exist generally lack adequate oversight mechanisms. Consequently,
third parties like B Lab play an important role as the primary enforcement entities
ensuring that benefit corporations adhere to their stated purposes. The U.S.
benefit corporation could gain from a close analysis of the U.K. community
interest corporation, as the latter model places greater emphasis on impacts to
local community and operates under strict government oversight. Simultaneously,
U.K. community interest corporations could enhance their efficacy by
incorporating benefit corporations’ emphasis on global branding. By gaining
from the other’s strengths, U.S. benefit corporations and U.K. community interest
corporations could gain considerable influence, not only as profitable and
community-centered businesses but also as global leaders in today’s growing
social enterprise movement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of B Lab, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to
certifying corporations who wish to identify as “B Corps” 1 in 2007, more
than a thousand companies across the United States have either incorporated
or reincorporated as “benefit corporations.” 2 Benefit corporations are
companies dedicated to a “triple bottom line” of “people, planet, and profit,”
and have become some of the fastest growing companies in the United
States. 3 Though social enterprise has become increasingly well-recognized
in the corporate sphere both internationally and in the United States, the
concept is relatively novel and requires additional study, governance, and
attention.
The emergence of the U.S. benefit corporation coincided directly with
the emergence of a similar hybrid corporate structure in the United Kingdom:
the community interest corporation (“CIC”). 4 A conjunctive examination of
U.S. benefit corporations and U.K. CICs demonstrates that social enterprise
has been a widely growing and profitable venture in both countries. This
success is largely due to strict incorporation and termination measures, as
well as evolving systems of external third-party oversight.
In the United States, benefit corporations are business entities that place
purpose over profits, or at least purpose alongside profits, while effectively
capitalizing on this social “do-good” status. 5 In the U.K., successful CICs
consist of local companies devoted to serving the immediate community.
While CICs, like benefit corporations, focus on aligning profit and purpose,
they are not as concerned with attaining global recognition under the social

1 It is important to note from the onset that “benefit corporations” are not the same as “B Corps.” In
this Note, the former will refer to corporate entities individual state legislation recognizes as social impact
companies, while the latter refers to a trademark owned by nonprofit organization, B Lab, as a label for
social impact companies that meet its “B Corp” standards. See James Surowiecki, Companies With
Benefits, NEW YORKER, Aug. 4, 2014, at 23.
2 Id. (“There are now more than a thousand B corps in the U.S., including Patagonia, Etsy, and
Seventh Generation. And in the past four years twenty-seven states have passed laws allowing companies
to incorporate themselves as ‘benefit corporations’—which are similar to B corps but not identical.”).
3 See Efreeburg, Good Growth: 26 B corps on the Inc 5000 List, B CORPORATION: THE BLOG (Aug.
21, 2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/good-growth-26-b-corps-on-the-inc-5000-list; see also
Mary Turck, Opinion, Corporations That Benefit People and the Planet, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Mar. 13
2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/corporations-that-benefit-people-and-theplanet.html (“B Corporations pursue a triple bottom line: profit for shareholders, good for the environment
and benefits for society.”).
4 REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, ANNUAL REPORT 2012/2013, 6, 35 (2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243869/13-p117community-interest-companies-annual-report-2012-2013.pdf (“The UK is widely recognized as having
the most highly evolved social enterprise sector in the world and this is due, in no small part, to CICs.”).
5 Surowiecki, supra note 1.
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enterprise label. 6 These differing motivations are crucial in determining
whether these forms of social enterprise actually work. Because CICs have
an inherently local focus, they have more effective accountability and
oversight systems in place. In contrast, benefit corporations lack this local
accountability and instead place greater focus on maximizing global profits
based on “B Corp” branding. Thus, benefit corporations require additional
accountability to guarantee sustainable, reliable, and global impact. As such,
benefit corporations should follow the lead of CICs in this regard.
The inverse, however, is also true. While benefit corporations focus
disproportionately on branding, CICs let this aspect fall to the wayside,
which can be problematic for a number of reasons. With increased attention
to the CIC brand, 7 CICs could expand local positive impacts to national, or
even international, levels. Thus, the differences between the two entities
reveal that each respective system can gain from the other. Combining the
effective aspects of both social enterprise models would therefore ensure that
social enterprise works in the long-term.
In order to examine the thesis laid out in the preceding paragraph, this
Note will proceed as follows. Part I will discuss the status of benefit
corporations in the United States by focusing on two U.S. benefit
corporations and explain key criticisms of the current U.S. benefit
corporation model. Part II will discuss the status of CICs in the United
Kingdom by focusing on two U.K. CICs, address key criticisms of the current
CIC model, and identify key differences from the U.S. benefit corporation
model. Part III will introduce recommendations to improve both models in
their respective countries, addressing the core issue raised in this Note—
whether these two forms of social enterprise actually work and what can be
done to improve social enterprise legislation. Finally, Part IV will conclude
by explaining why attention to the mentioned recommendations will become
increasingly important to the globalized economy.

6 While the definition of “social enterprise” varies, this Note will consider all legally recognized
businesses, which have acquired the proper registration, filings, and requirements, to fall under this “social
enterprise” heading. For a more in-depth discussion of the varying definitions of “social enterprise,” see
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and Benefit Corporation
Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 n. 4 (2012); see also HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER
NUMBER 03426, COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, 4 (UK) (including a description of “social
enterprise” provided by the House of Commons Library); SUSAN M. MANWARING & ANDREW
VALENTINE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN CANADA: STRUCTURAL OPTIONS 1, 4 (2011).
7 The term brand in this Note does not refer to a commonly recognized or registered trademark, but
instead refers to the favorable public image that results when a company incorporates as either a benefit
corporation or community interest corporation.
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II. UNITED STATES: BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
A. Background
In order to become a benefit corporation in the United States, a business
entity must pursue the general public benefit, file annual benefit reports, and
measure its progress against third-party standards. 8 A “benefit corporation”
is a corporate structure offered by an individual state, under statute. 9 Benefit
corporations are only available in thirty U.S. states and Washington, D.C. 10
Benefit corporation is not synonymous with B Corp. B Corps are
defined as companies who have received B Corp certification from the
nonprofit organization B Lab, one of the most well recognized third-party
organizations and proponents of benefit corporation legislation in the United
States. 11 B Lab requires certified B Corps and B Corp applicants to take the
B Impact Assessment Survey 12 and also uses various rating systems (e.g. the
Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) and the Impact Reporting
and Investment Standards (IRIS)) to ensure that each certified B Corp meets
both B Lab and organization-specific standards. 13
According to B Lab, the B Impact Assessment Survey aims to identify
a company’s “current impact” via an “objective, comprehensive rating” 14
after examining four impact areas: governance, workers, community, and
environment. 15 In contrast, reporting indicators like IRIS assess whether a
company is reporting its societal impacts in the most efficient way. 16 B Lab
8

See B Lab, FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
Id.
10 See B Lab, Benefit Corporations & Certified B Corps, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
businesses/benefit-corporations-and-certified-b-corps (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
11 See B Lab, About B Lab, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/about-b-lab (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“B Lab is a nonprofit organization that serves a global
movement of people using business as a force for good”).
12 See B Lab, Performance Requirements, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/
become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
13 See Murray, supra note 6, at 31.
14 B
Lab, Frequently Asked Questions: Top 10, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
http://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/frequently-asked-questions/top-10#how-does-this-relate-toother-impact-measurement-systems (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
15 See
B Lab, 2011 B Impact Report: Patagonia, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
http://bimpactassessment.net/patagonia-2011-report (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). The “governance”
category examines accountability and transparency; the “workers” category examines compensation,
benefits & training, worker ownership, and worker environment; the “community” category examines
community products and services, community practices, suppliers and distributors, local, diversity, job
creation, and civic engagement and giving; and the “environment” category examines environmental
products and services, environmental practices, land, office, plant, energy, water, materials, emissions
water, waste, and suppliers and transportation.
16 See B Lab, The Standards, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, http://bimpactassessment.net/how-itworks/frequently-asked-questions/the-standards (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“[Platforms like IRIS] are
9
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states that both types of reporting indicators are “critical” to its B Impact
Assessment. 17 Benefit corporation legislation generally recognizes B Corps
as an acceptable type of benefit corporation entity and B Lab’s B Impact
Assessment Survey as an acceptable third-party standard.
In contrast, general benefit corporations are held to lower accountability
standards than certified B Corps. While benefit corporation statutes largely
require corporations to publish and publicize annual benefit reports measured
against third-party standards, this requirement merely serves as an
unenforced preliminary assessment tool. 18 Thus, a benefit corporation does
not necessarily have to meet the third-party standard it has adopted, unless
externally required by the third party (like B Lab), in order to retain its status
under the benefit corporation brand. 19
B. The Benefit Corporation Branding Advantage as Exemplified by
Etsy and Patagonia
In the United States, one of the key advantages of becoming a benefit
corporation is branding. Whether classified as a certified “B Corp” under B
Lab’s standards or as a legally recognized benefit corporation in the eyes of
the law, the benefit corporation label essentially opens up partnership
opportunities with already existing benefit corporations that favor doing
business with similarly socially conscious companies. Further, registered
benefit corporations can effectively utilize marketing strategies that advertise
the company’s socially conscious status to the general public. These
companies can convince consumers that by purchasing from the company, a
consumer is not merely purchasing for one’s own benefit but contributing to
a greater social good. Several social enterprise companies have successfully

likely to define specific way[s] to report impact metrics, [like] how to best report a company’s carbon
emissions, so that all carbon reports in the future can be easily comparable to each other.”).
17 Id.
18 See B Lab, supra note 8.
19 However, most, if not all, Certified B Corps are simultaneously benefit corporations because B
Lab requires Certified B Corps to apply for benefit corporation status if the state in which the company
has incorporated has passed benefit corporation legislation. Conversely, not all benefit corporations are
Certified B Corps. See Brady Dale, Over Etsy’s B Corp status, who will bend: B Lab or Etsy?,
TECHNICAL.LY: BROOKLYN (Mar. 16, 2015, 2:47 pm), http://technical.ly/brooklyn/2015/03/16/etsy-ipob-corp-status/; see also B Lab, Corporation Legal Roadmap, BCORPORATION.NET,
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporationlegal-roadmap (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
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capitalized on this benefit, including Etsy, 20 Patagonia, 21 Ben & Jerry’s, 22
and Warby Parker. 23
The DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Internet trend, which allowed consumers to
create their own products, home goods, and styles at home, quickly gave rise
to Etsy, “the online bazaar of handcrafted goods.” 24 When Etsy obtained B
Corp certification in May 2012, the online goods site originally scored 80.1
out of 200 on B Lab’s B Impact Assessment survey, barely passing B Lab’s
certification threshold of 80 by only 0.1 points. 25 While the score may have
troubled both consumers and employees at first, Etsy’s Chief Executive,
Chad Dickerson, portrayed the score as an opportunity to publicly
demonstrate Etsy’s growth in the social enterprise realm. Dickerson stated,
“What the certification allowed us to do was identify various areas in the
company that we wanted to improve upon.” 26
Four years later, in 2016, Etsy’s B Impact Score was 127, 27 almost 47
points higher than its initial scoring. In 2013, B Lab honored Etsy with its
“Race to the Top” award for “largest improvement in a B Corp’s score.” 28
Dickerson stated that the company’s B Corp certification and improved B
Impact Score “helped with brand[ing] . . . [and] increase[d] a sense of trust
in Etsy if you’re a customer of the business—that you’re going to have a
good experience, that Etsy is doing the right thing and that Etsy will be here
for the long term.” 29 Thus, Etsy’s B Corp status, along with its increased B
Impact score, established Etsy as a more sustainable organization in the eyes
of consumers and employees alike.
In addition to implementing internal changes to improve its B Corp
score, Etsy also became a publicly traded company on April 16, 2015. Etsy
considered the ramifications of this decision to go public and reconciled them
with the possibility of remaining a publicly held benefit corporation. For
20 See B Lab, B Impact Report: Etsy, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/
community/etsy (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
21 See B Lab, B Impact Report: Patagonia, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/
community/patagonia-inc (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
22 See B Lab, B Impact Report: Ben & Jerry’s, BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/
community/ben-and-jerrys (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
23 See B Lab, supra note 21.
24 Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker have in common, WASH. POST (April
20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/04/20/what-etsy-patagoniaand-warby-parker-have-in-common/.
25 Kate Abnett, Fashion’s B Corporations Blend Business with Social Good, BUS. OF FASHION (Oct.
26, 2014, 21:17), http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/intelligence/fashions-b-corporations-blendbusiness-social-good.
26 Id.
27 See B Lab, supra note 20.
28 See Abnett, supra note 25.
29 See id.
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instance, Etsy noted under “Risk Factors” in its Initial Public Offering filing
that, “[O]ur reputation could be harmed if we lose our status as a Certified B
Corporation, whether by our choice or by our failure to meet B Lab’s
Certification requirements. Likewise, our reputation could be harmed if our
publicly reported B Corporation score declines.” 30 Further, under its “Our
Values” section in the same IPO filing, Etsy clearly identified its Certified B
Corporation status as a key value “integral to everything we do,” including
“to minimize the harm and maximize the benefit that we have on people and
the planet.” 31 Etsy’s clear and direct references to B Lab even within its
official corporate filings demonstrate how profoundly Etsy values its
Certified B Corp status as part of its general brand.
Cementing one’s brand as a benefit corporation not only piques the
interest of socially conscious consumers, but also attracts socially conscious
businesses. Elissa Loughman, manager of product responsibility at
Patagonia, shared that the company bases its collaboration decisions on the
B Corp statuses of other businesses, vendors, and suppliers. As such, in
Patagonia’s eyes, a company’s B Corp status “adds value.” 32 Patagonia’s
overall B Impact Score is 114/200 33 and the company’s website emphasizes
its shared goal with B Lab to “[g]et[] brands to reexamine their fiduciary
responsibility and . . . to change the nature of business by changing corporate
law.” 34
Based on these examples, one cannot understate the advantages of
benefit corporation registration and B Corp certification on a company’s
global branding and marketing strategy. Third-party entities like B Lab that
conduct audits, suggest improvement measures, and present awards to
certified B Corps essentially allow benefit corporations to publicly improve
as socially conscious companies and simultaneously maximize brand
recognition and partnership outlets through that process.
C. Lack of Accountability and Oversight: The Key Flaw of Benefit
Corporations
Critics of benefit corporations point out flaws under two general
categories: 1) lack of accountability in existing benefit corporation

30

Etsy, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 15, (March 4, 2015).
Id. at 97.
32 Abnett, supra note 25 (“[Patagonia does] purchase products from outside vendors and so that can
help us to decide who we want to partner with in terms of other businesses and other products . . . If a
company has B Corp status, we definitely notice it and that adds value.”).
33 See B Lab, supra note 21.
34 B Lab, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=68413 (last visited Dec.
19, 2016).
31
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legislation and 2) lack of oversight by benefit corporation directors.
Insufficient clarity in these two categories leads to “faux corporate social
responsibility.” 35 According to Kyle Westaway, a leading blogger and
adviser to New York benefit corporations, “corporate social responsibility”
refers to “responsible corporate decision-making that considers the broad
impact of corporate actions on people, communities and the environment.” 36
The language within state-specific benefit corporation legislation remains
vague and overarching, unable to provide sufficient accountability. In most
states, benefit corporation legislation requires annual benefit reports prepared
in line with third-party standards. The legislation itself does not specify
which third party to use or how to ensure that the third-party assessment
would be credible. 37 Without guidelines specifying what an annual benefit
report should contain or which third-party standards should apply, a
corporation is only required to vaguely pursue the “general public benefit.”
Though statutes require benefit corporations to “disclose the formula by
which [each] standard is computed” and that the selected standard “assess the

35

Murray, supra note 6, at 33:
[W]ithout at least some minimal level of board accountability, the benefit corporation statute
could be an avenue to greenwashing and faux CSR rather than an antidote to them. In fact, if
an appropriate accountability framework is not erected, benefit corporations could allow for
an unprecedented amount of rent-seeking and could allow greater management entrenchment
than permitted in other entity forms;
see also Rae André, Benefit Corporations at a Crossroads: As Lawyers Weigh in, Companies Weigh Their
Options, BUS. HORIZONS 243, 243 (2015):
[B]enefit corporations do not empower stakeholders, and therefore are not substantially
different from traditional corporations . . . [instead], paradoxically, benefit corporations
actually inhibit corporate social responsibility efforts by perpetuating the myth that business
corporations do not have the flexibility to pursue social missions, and by claiming to, but
failing to empower stakeholders . . . [and] enhances public cynicism about all corporations by
creating competing sets of ‘beneficial’ and ‘other’ corporations.
36 Kyle Westaway, Balancing Purpose and Profit: Legal Mechanisms to Lock in Social Mission for
“Profit and Purpose” Businesses Across the G8, TRUST.ORG 130 (Dec. 2014), http://www.trust.org/
contentAsset/raw-data/1d3b4f99-2a65-49f9-9bc0-39585bc52cac/file. Westaway also notes that, in the
United Kingdom, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is by in large voluntary though laws and
regulations that provide a general framework for CSR. Id.
37 For instance, New York’s benefit corporation statute requires a benefit corporation to deliver an
“annual benefit report” that includes:
an assessment of the performance of the benefit corporation, relative to its general public
benefit purpose assessed against a third-party standard applied consistently with any
application of that standard in prior benefit reports or accompanied by an explanation of the
reasons for any inconsistent application and, if applicable, assessment of the performance of
the benefit corporation, relative to its specific public benefit purpose or purposes.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAW § 1708 (McKinney 2012); see also B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation,
BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Dec. 19, 2016)
(showing third-party legislation statuses as well as assessment and oversight requirements for all thirtyone states that have currently passed benefit corporation legislation).
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effects of the corporation’s decision on employees, suppliers, customers,
community, and the environment—the stakeholders,” the ambiguous
definition of what actually constitutes “general public benefit” obscures a
consistent assessment across benefit corporations in a particular state,
especially by the average citizen. 38
This overarching ambiguity results from state legislatures’ deference to
B Lab and similar third-party entities that have led the benefit corporation
movement and the legislatures’ desire to offer benefit corporations
flexibility. B Lab even provides a template for state legislatures that wish to
enact benefit corporation legislation, proposing language that gives
incredible discretion to third parties. 39 While the proposed template includes
additional explanation of why third-party standards are important, the
versions adopted by most state legislatures lack this explanation. Instead,
most legislation includes only a vague requirement to measure against thirdparty standards without specifying which third parties are credible or
appropriate. 40
Further, most benefit corporation statutes fail to include dissenters’
rights provisions. As such, neither the directors nor the corporation itself will
be sanctioned if the company strays from its initial social purpose. 41 Under
this framework, there is truly no option for accountability. Even if third-party
assessments show that a benefit corporation is performing in violation of its
stated social purposes, the corporation faces no threat of liability—at least
directly under statute. Instead, a third party, like B Lab, must threaten the loss
of its B Corp certification for any accountability to exist at all. In this way,
benefit corporations that have incorporated under statutes without dissenters’
rights provisions face accountability only if they value the third-party “B
Corp” or equivalent brand.
38 Thomas J. White III, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight Through Creation Of The Benefit
Corporation Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329, 344 (2015) (“One would think the legislation would
pronounce a defined third-party standard in order to provide the market with an objective point of
comparison,” but “[i]nstead, the benefit corporation is given free range to hire a third-party to draft said
standard [and] [s]o long as the standard meets the statutory requirements, it will prove sufficient.”).
39 See B Lab, Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf
(“The
requirement in section 401 that a benefit corporation prepare an annual benefit report that assesses its
performance in creating general public benefit against a third-party standard provides an important
protection against the abuse of benefit corporation status.”).
40 But see J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on A Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations
Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85,
92 (2012) (Callison argues that B Lab’s model legislation is “too rigid and uncompromising” and is a onesize-fits-all approach to benefit corporation legislation that “will ultimately discourage corporations from
becoming benefit corporations and will discourage outside investment in benefit corporations and
consumer validation of benefit corporation status.”).
41 See Westaway, supra note 36, at 129.
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The outcome is not much better in the few states that do include
dissenters’ rights provisions in their respective benefit corporation
legislation. Though benefit corporation legislation in these jurisdictions
theoretically provides a right of action against the corporation’s board of
directors should they fail to pursue the company’s stated social goals, only
one such lawsuit has ever been filed. 42 This lack of litigation under
dissenters’ rights provisions makes unclear whether these dissenters’ rights
provisions are meaningful, though theoretically actionable. Despite the
existence of these dissenters’ rights provisions, both state legislatures and
potential dissenters alike have deferred to third-party entities to rectify
statutory violations. In practice, accountability has become the responsibility
of third parties. 43
This first criticism about the vagueness of benefit corporation
legislation understates the effectiveness of benefit corporation legislation
when coupled with enforcement by credible and responsible third-party
entities like B Lab. Strong internal metrics within a corporation, continued
audits and oversight by third parties, and annual benefit reports are currently
preventing faux corporate social responsibility and will continue to
effectively do so in the future. A successful benefit corporation that has
realized the benefits of social enterprise branding becomes directly
accountable not only to a third party, but to the public. The ramifications of
being directly liable to the public, the audience to which the company
promised the “general public benefit” in the first place, guarantee an inability
to outright shirk responsibility. Though legislatures should certainly improve
benefit corporation legislation with clearer dissenters’ rights and procedural
complaint processing provisions, if a benefit corporation strays from its
stated social purposes, third-party assessments will publicly expose the
corporation to the public and thereby coerce change. If the company intends
to continue operating under the benefit corporation brand, it must comply.
However, the current lack of oversight and accountability in U.S.
benefit corporations does not solely stem from statutory language—it also
results from ambiguous fiduciary responsibilities of corporate directors. 44
42

Jesse Finfrock, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1881.
See Callison, supra note 40, at 94–95.
44 Murray, supra note 6, at 27–28 (citing Model Benefit Corp. Legis. § 301(a)):
Directors of benefit corporations are told they must consider the effects of any action on such
diverse groups as: (1) shareholders; (2) employees . . . (3) customers; (4) community and
society; (5) “the local and global environment”; (6) “the short and long term interests of the
benefit corporation”; and (7) “the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general
public purpose and any specific public benefit purpose.” Since Biblical times, it has been wellrecognized that people cannot properly serve two masters, much less seven or more;
see also Shelly Alcorn, Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change, ASAE: THE CENTER
FOR ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP, https://www.asaecenter.org/resources/articles/an_magazine/2012/april43
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Benefit corporation legislation does not specify how corporate directors must
fulfill their obligation that the benefit corporation simultaneously pursues
profits and purpose. In fact, the lack of distinction from the fiduciary duties
of traditional, nonbenefit corporations imply that ordinary nonbenefit
corporations could technically achieve the same goals with the right
directors. The business judgment rule for traditional corporations would
allow for sufficient flexibility for corporate directors to carry out social good
even without this new corporate form. 45
In reality, this criticism is merely theoretical. This scenario assumes that
benefit corporation directors and traditional corporation directors have the
same priorities when making business decisions. 46 In practice, unlike
traditional corporation directors, while benefit corporation directors can and
should keep shareholders’ interests in mind, they must keep the general
public benefit—e.g., clean water, affordable outdoors products, and
preservation of environment—as their highest priority. Regardless of
emerging conflicts between directors, the primary purpose of a company’s
existence as a benefit corporation is to preserve these public benefits. Benefit
corporation legislation does not outline detailed ways in which directors
should achieve a company’s stated goals, which allows directors flexibility
to pursue the company’s primary purpose in ways both the directors and the
general public deem most effective. But even with this flexibility, benefit
corporation directors must always keep the general public benefit in mind in
addition to profit motives.
Several nonprofits have also actively denounced benefit corporations. 47
Such nonprofits assert that benefit corporations do not have accountability
because pursuing a “greater public benefit” is too vague. Instead, benefit
corporations “blur[] the lines between for-profits and nonprofits, potentially
misleading consumers” and causing unnecessary competition for

may/benefit-corporations-a-new-formula-for-social-change (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
45 But see Finfrock, supra note 42, at 1870 (In certain states like California, “the state does not permit
flexibility in the statement of a corporate purpose within a corporate charter, constraining incorporators
instead to utilize a stock set of phrases that do not clearly admit social entrepreneurship goals” and
directors must thus “weigh costs and benefits of their decisions across a large number of constituencies,
including shareholders [and] corporate stakeholders.”).
46 Id. (Even for non-social enterprise companies, the business judgment rule only “grants fiduciaries
discretion about how to serve their shareholder interests, [but] arguably does not give discretion about
whether to do so [and] [c]onsequently, for decisions that patently sacrifice shareholder welfare for the
benefit of other considerations (including social purpose), even the BJR provides wavering protection.”).
47 In 2012, the California Association of Nonprofits (“CAN”) served as a particularly critical voice
against proposed legislation that would strengthen benefit corporations. CAN’s chief executive officer
repeatedly vocalized doubts on “the need to provide ‘nonprofit-like preferences’ and advantages to forprofit companies that are not legally required to adhere to ‘nonprofit-like restrictions and oversight.’” Id.
at 1884.
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nonprofits. 48 While consumers may admittedly confuse benefit corporations
and nonprofits, it is important to note that this confusion will exist only
initially. The continued acceptance of new social enterprise forms will make
differences between corporate forms clearer, especially as more successful
benefit corporations tout the benefit corporation brand. Regardless, if
nonprofits truly exist to better communities and promote social good, why
denounce benefit corporations—simply another avenue to expand the
cumulative pie of doing good? 49 The Center for Association Leadership
acknowledged nonprofit concern about increased competition with benefit
corporations for social-good funding, but noted that funding options for both
entities “already exist,” so this dynamic is actually “nothing new.” 50
Finally, as previously mentioned, the entire purpose of recognizing
benefit corporations as a formal corporate form is to allow these entities the
ability to specially tailor their goals and profit motives for individualized
social enterprise purposes. While state-specific statutes, especially
dissenters’ rights, third-party standards, and fiduciary-responsibility
provisions deserve reevaluation and revision to increase clarity, limiting
statutory language to narrow or concretely define what falls under “general
public benefit” 51 would defeat the purpose of flexibility. A successful benefit
corporation must be able to tailor its goals to promote social good in
innovative and effective ways. Current benefit corporation legislation
correctly reflects this need for flexibility, although there is room for
improvement.
III. UNITED KINGDOM: COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES
A. Background
In the United Kingdom, Community Interest Companies (CICs) have
become widely accepted and celebrated forms of incorporation. The CIC
derived from the idea of creating a “public interest company” 52 and was
48

See Alcorn, supra note 44.
The Center remarked, “Call us altruistic, but don’t nonprofits want for-profit enterprises to do more
good for society and the environment? And, as an association leader, if a benefit entity is helping address
the same problem as my association, shouldn’t I be happy about that?” Id.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1706 (McKinney 2012) (“Every benefit corporation shall have
a purpose of creating a general public benefit . . . [and] [t]he purpose to create general public benefit shall
be a limitation on the other purpose of the benefit corporation, and shall control over any inconsistent
purpose of the benefit corporation.”).
52 Analysis: The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies, THIRD SECTOR (June 1, 2015),
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/analysis-rise-rise-community-interest-companies/governance/article/
1348096.
49
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officially introduced in 2004 under the Companies Audit Investigations and
Community Enterprise Act (Companies Act). The Companies Act governs
company law in the United Kingdom. On August 11, 2005, the first CIC
incorporated in the United Kingdom. 53 The 2004 Companies Act became
especially effective when “given effect by two subsequent Regulations”: the
Community Interest Company Regulations of 2005 and the Community
Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations of 2009. 54 By March 2012,
over 6,000 CICs had formally registered and incorporated in the United
Kingdom. 55
While the Companies Act did not offer any specific strategies or
mechanisms for CIC governance initially, 56 the U.K. government made clear
that a CIC must publicly file a “CIC Report” within twenty-one months of
incorporation (and subsequently, annually), describing the actions the CIC
has taken to benefit the community in line with the company’s initially stated
community interest purpose. 57 These reports serve a similar function to the
annual benefit reports state legislatures require in the United States.
In order to become a CIC in the United Kingdom, a business entity must
develop a “community interest statement” that outlines “what it will do, who
it will help and how.” 58 Further, it must create an “asset lock,” 59 and have its
application approved by the “community interest company regulator.” 60 The
53

REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 38.
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 6, at 5.
55 REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 38–39 (Geographically,
“[a]lmost 93% of all CICs are registered in England whilst fewer than 600 are registered in total in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.”).
56 See Stuart R. Cross, The Community Interest Company: More Confusion in the Quest For Limited
Liability?, 55 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 302, 312 (2004).
57 See REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, ANNUAL REPORT 2014/2015 1, 18
(2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445334/cic-15-15
-annual-report-14-15.pdf; see also OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES,
INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NOTES CHAPTER 9: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211749/13-712community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-9-corporate-governance.pdf.
58 OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS FOR FUNDING ORGANISATIONS 1, 7 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524219/13-782-community-interest-companies-frequently-askedquestions-for-funding-organisations.pdf.
59 An asset lock is “a commitment by CICs and those who set them up to lock profits and assets into
the company irrevocably,” through the implementation of the following two measures: “(a) prohibit or
impose limits on the distribution of assets by community interest companies to their members, and (b)
impose limits on the payment of interests on debentures issued by, or debts of, community interest
companies.” Cross supra note 56, at 310–11; see also Terrance S. Carter & Theresa L.M. Man, Canadian
Registered Charities: Business Activities and Social Enterprise—Thinking Outside the Box, 2008 NAT’L
CTR ON PHILANTHROPY & L. ANN. CONF., 1, 6 (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.carters.ca/pub/article/
charity/2008/tsc1024.pdf.
60 Setting Up A Social Enterprise, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/set-up-a-social-enterprise (last
54
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company’s community interest statement must pass a “community interest
test” that “confirm[s] that it will pursue purposes beneficial to the
community” instead of merely serving “an unduly restricted group of
beneficiaries.” 61 A CIC must “deliver an annual community interest company
report about its activities for the public record . . . [which] includes details of
assets transferred for less than market value; dividends paid; stakeholder
involvement; and directors’ remuneration.” 62
The Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies
randomly selects annual reports filed by CICs for examination. The CIC
Regulator’s powers derive from the Companies Act, and the Regulator’s
Office works with the Companies Investigation Unit of the Insolvency
Services to determine whether a deeper investigation is necessary. 63
B. The CIC Focus on Local Communities—Bad for Branding, Good
for Accountability
1. CIC Focus on Local Communities is Bad for Branding
While U.S. benefit corporations benefit from social enterprise branding,
CICs in the United Kingdom are not motivated by these same advantages.
For example, of the 61 companies that have applied to B Lab to become B
Corps in the United Kingdom so far, “[m]ost are small and medium-sized
businesses,” 64 not large, global companies hoping to sell products in foreign
markets.
Even larger B Corps in the United Kingdom function more like
nonprofit organizations rather than like for-profit businesses. For instance,
one larger B Corp in the United Kingdom is Ingeus, “an employment
company that runs the government’s back to work scheme.” 65 With a B
Impact Assessment score of 137/200, Ingeus proudly describes itself on its
website as a “founding member of the B Corp Community in the U.K.” 66 and

visited Dec. 19, 2016).
61 Further, the community interest test is “whether a reasonable person could consider the CIC’s
activities to benefit the community.” HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 6, at 5.
62 See OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES supra note 58, at 5.
63 See FOI Release: Information released under the Freedom of Information Act, GOV.UK, 1, 2 (July
28,
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360497/
Information_release_10_-_Complaints_about_CICs.pdf; see also HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY supra
note 6, at 10.
64 Oscar Williams-Grut, The Ethical Business ‘B Corp’ Movement Just Landed in the U.K., BUS.
INSIDER (Sep. 27, 2015, 1:54 pm), http://www.businessinsider.com/b-corporation-uk-2015-9?r=
UK&IR=T.
65 Id.
66 About Us, INGEUS, http://www.ingeus.co.uk/about/about-us,70 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
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as a “leading provider of people-centered services.” 67 Thus, while falling
under the same “B Corp” label as U.S. benefit corporations, B Corps in the
United Kingdom focus on serving local communities within the country and
not on global marketing or B Corp branding.
In other words, while U.S. benefit corporations focus on more global
benefits, CICs (even large ones like Ingeus) place most of their emphasis on
local, community benefits. Thus, even B Lab’s recognition of a particular
company as a “B Corp” does not imply that a U.K. B Corp functions similarly
to a U.S. benefit corporation. While continuing to target local communities,
CICs could gain from prioritizing branding as U.S. benefit corporations do
to achieve increased awareness and wider profit margins.
Nonetheless, in some ways, traditional CICs are more comparable to
benefit corporations than nonprofits. CICs can opt to become Certified B
Corps, though not all U.K. B Corps are exclusively CICs. 68 Like benefit
corporations, CICs prioritize public benefit, and registration as a CIC
presents no tax advantages (as opposed to registration as a nonprofit or
charity). CIC registration also requires annual CIC reports. The U.K.
government compiles a list of “Community Interest Companies: Case
Studies” that “give a flavour of the good work Community Interest
Companies (CICs) are doing around the UK.” 69 Well-recognized CICs range
from theaters to small stores to programs and projects.
Most CICs are organizations or programs that are very focused on being
community-driven and local, whether by the community or for the
community. Bristol Together, for example, is a community-driven CIC that
exists specifically to “create[] jobs for ex-offenders and long-term
unemployed people.” 70 Paul Harrod, Bristol Together’s Founder,
emphasized that the CIC is “not about job preparation,” but about “actually
creat[ing] jobs,” 71 setting the organization apart from nonprofits or charities

67

Id.
See Protect Your Mission, BCORPORATION.UK, http://bcorporation.uk/become-a-b-corp/whybecome-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission-uk (last visited Dec. 19, 2016):
Any UK business is likely to be eligible for B Corp certification as long as the business can
demonstrate; It generates the majority of its revenue from trading, It competes in a competitive
marketplace, It is NOT a charity, It is NOT a public body or otherwise majority owned by the
state;
see also B Corps FAQ, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE UK, http://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/news/corps-faq (last
visited Dec. 19, 2016).
69 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Community Interest Companies: Case
Studies, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/community-interest-companies-casestudies (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
70 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Case Study: Bristol Together,
GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/bristol-together (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
71 Id.
68
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that focus on the former.
Other CICs emerged through efforts by the community itself. For
instance, Blues and Beer is an annual festival where hundreds gather to
“enjoy live blues music and artisan beer.” 72 John Curry, the Chairman of
Blues and Beer, described the decision to become a CIC as one made by the
“loosely knit group of people” who had initially run the festival each year
when the group realized that “having a more formal structure” would
generate increased financial security. 73 After becoming a CIC and effectively
realizing the financial benefits of a more formal organization, Curry stated
that the annual festival became “more than just a blues festival . . . [it
became] a real opportunity to celebrate the local community.” 74
Consequently, in the United Kingdom, CICs largely exist as entities that
strengthen and celebrate local communities rather than as corporate
structures that seek wider global branding or reputational advantages.
While U.S. benefit corporations aim to sell products under a “benefit
corporation” label, U.K. community interest corporations aim to provide
services by and for communities. The U.K. government’s website
characterizes the “‘CIC’ brand” as one that “describ[es] a company working
for the benefit of the community.” 75 In contrast, the U.S. website
“benefitcorp.net” provides a more in-depth explanation of the importance of
the “benefit corporation” brand, describing advantages in concrete subsections that include, “Positive Brand Association” and “Brand Trust.” 76 As
such, U.S. proponents of benefit corporations clearly recognize the branding
component as a crucial motivating factor for any business considering
incorporating as a benefit corporation. Currently, this emphasis on branding
is almost entirely absent from the descriptions of CICs in the United
Kingdom, and one that CICs can and should utilize to obtain broader
recognition and impact.
72 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Case Study: Blues and Beers, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/blues-and-beers (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 58, at 5.
76 Describing “Positive Brand Association,” the website explains:
Becoming a benefit corporation confirms brand association with positive social and
environmental impact in the mind of consumers and in the industry more broadly. An
increasing number of consumers, over 70 million today, purchase goods based on the morals
or the mission of a business and, increasingly, a company’s mission is a major factor
influencing brand loyalty.
B Lab, Benefit Corporations: Frequently Asked Questions for Investors, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/FAQs%20Investors%206_9.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
Describing “Brand Trust,” the website explains, “[b]enefit corporations provide an innovative model to
hold a company accountable to its mission and, by committing to this higher purpose, create customer
trust.” Id.
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2. CIC Focus on Local Communities is Good from an
Accountability Standpoint
More starkly, CIC legislation provides clearer specifications about how
to monitor CICs than U.S. benefit corporation legislation provides about how
to monitor benefit corporations. For instance, in its annual community
interest report, a CIC must include “how the company’s activities have
benefited the community; what steps were taken to consult stakeholders and
what was the outcome; what payments were made to directors; what assets
transferred other than for full consideration; what dividends were paid; and
what performance-related interest was paid on loans or debentures.” 77
Further, CIC legislation specifies procedures for individuals concerned about
a particular CIC to report their concerns to the CIC Regulator. 78
In contrast, benefit corporation legislation requires annual benefit
reports without explanation of what these benefit reports or third-party
standards must include to be acceptable. Most benefit corporation legislation
leaves out any procedural guidelines for individuals who want to express
concerns about existing benefit corporations. Even if broad “dissenter’s
rights” provisions exist, they are hardly utilized. Instead, state legislatures
disproportionately rely on third-party entities to handle regulatory and
remedial measures, including dealing with stakeholder complaints. Thus, the
U.S. government must take a leaf from the United Kingdom’s book and
establish more effective oversight procedures to preserve benefit
corporations’ long-term legitimacy.
C. Criticisms
While criticisms of CICs do not include lack of legislative oversight
mechanisms or weakness of CIC accountability, CICs share one specific
criticism with benefit corporations: CICs and more common not-for-profit
forms like charities are too similar. This argument implies that a current CIC

77

See Murray, supra note 6, at 11.
Id. at 13 (“If a funder has concerns about a community interest company (CIC) that it is funding,
those concerns should be raised with the Regulator of CIC” and the Regulator possesses “supervisory
powers . . . to intervene in the affairs of a community interest company (CIC) (for example by appointing
or removing directors)”); see also, REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4 (“As
a light touch regulator we use our powers of supervision sparingly, but they are significant and if we need
to take action against a CIC we will use them.”); id. (outlining the “five key areas” the CIC Regulator will
consider when deciding whether to take supervisory action against a CIC, which are, “evidence of
misconduct or mismanagement,” “a need to protect the assets,” “the CIC is not satisfying the community
interest test,” “the CIC is not pursuing any activities in pursuit of its community interest objects,” and “the
CIC is engaging in political activities and/or political campaigning” as well as common scenarios in which
the Regulator would not take action).
78
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could operate as a nonprofit or charity without much difficulty. 79 Just as
benefit corporation critics argue that traditional U.S. corporations are
adequately flexible to pursue social benefit purposes without the benefit
corporation label, CIC-opponents view CICs as entities for “weasely people
who want[] to hide behind a veneer of social benefit without the same level
of accountability.” 80 These critics point to charities as an adequate means for
social impact. In fact, charities function better because CICs too easily offer
“the simplicity of company structure without the extra level of governance”
and “a less intense regulatory regime,” since annual community interest
reports are “the sole requirement.” 81 Like benefit corporation legislation that
requires only annual benefit reports under unspecified third-party standards,
the Office of the Regulator is admittedly “light-touch and rarely goes public
when following up [with] complaints.” 82
However, the Office of the CIC Regulator is a self-proclaimed “light
touch” regulator—the entity responsible for overseeing CICs purposely
embraces flexibility. The fact that the Regulator acknowledges and intends
to play only a light touch role further indicates that CICs in the United
Kingdom exist to operate in partnership with local communities. Because a
CIC serves and is comprised of a truly local community, the CIC’s
constituents can be more involved in, and perhaps be even more effective
than, the CIC Regulator. The communities that CICs serve firsthand witness
and experience the impact CICs make and are consequently able to provide
direct and pointed accountability. 83 Further, though the CIC Regulator vows
to use its “powers of supervision sparingly,” 84 being “light touch” still means
that the Regulator will follow an intricate Complaints Procedure Protocol to
determine whether or not it will take action on complaints received, 85 and not
that it will turn a blind eye.
Furthermore, while the difference between CICs and charities can be
confusing, the two organizations serve two distinctly different purposes and
any similarities are likely intentional. While charities enjoy tax benefits that
CICs do not, according to Phil Horrell, the office manager at the CIC
Regulator, being a CIC “theoretically offers greater potential for rapid
expansion and diversification, not only because of the looser financial

79 See Malcolm Lynch, For and Against the Community Interest Company, 28 INV. MATTERS 1, 1–
4 (2004).
80 See Analysis: The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies, supra note 52.
81 See id.
82 In contrast, the Charity Commission receives widespread publicity and statutory inquiries. See id.
83 See, e.g., Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, supra note 72.
84 REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 28.
85 See id. at 30 (“Complaints Procedure trading”).
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regulation but also because of the greater opportunities for raising capital.” 86
However, Horrell himself admitted that in order to fully realize such financial
benefits, the CIC must operate under “good business plans.” 87 Horrell
emphasized that a company should decide to become a CIC over a charity
mainly to “be branded as a social business” that the public will view “like [a]
charit[y]” while still operating under the “dynamism” of for-profit
businesses. 88 Further, Horrell emphasized that the CIC Regulator was not
trying to attract organizations who wanted to register as charities and
encouraged all applicants to note that “[a] charity can convert into a CIC and
vice-versa.” 89 Thus, the U.K. government and CIC Regulator have
recognized the ambiguity between CICs and charities, but have emphasized
that a company should become a CIC for distinctive branding purposes.
However, in practice, even the most successful CICs in the United
Kingdom do not sign on for the advantages of social enterprise branding.
More meaningfully, CICs and charities are two separate entities because they
cover two distinct degrees of benefit: benefit to the community and general
public benefit. 90 CICs aim to realize the capital advantages the CIC form
provides—both for the organization itself and for the community at large.
Meanwhile, continued ambiguity ensues and the social enterprise branding
motive becomes increasingly lost in the CIC/charity distinction. In order to
clarify the distinction and to equip CICs to fully realize maximum profits,
the CIC Regulator should place greater emphasis on establishing and
advertising the CIC brand.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
ACTUALLY WORK?
In order for social enterprise to actually work on a global scale, U.S.
benefit corporations and U.K. CICs must recognize and adopt the positive
attributes of the other system. Benefit corporations should adopt similar light
86 Paul Jump, How to: Decide Between Charitable and CIC Status, THIRD SECTOR (Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/to-decide-charitable-cic-status/governance/article/634004 (opportunities to
raise capital include CICs’ ability to use assets within asset-locks as “collateral for loans,” the ability to
issue shares though dividends payable to shareholders, “subject to a cap”). But see Matthew F. Doeringer,
Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291,
303 (2010) (operating a business as a social enterprise instead of as a for-profit entity overcomes the
“difficulty of raising capital” for for-profit entities because it “involves making choices that can lower the
potential to generate economic profits”).
87 See Jump, supra note 86.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 6 (Whereas the community interest test to become
a CIC is whether the CIC’s activities would “benefit the community,” charities must pass a different test—
”the charitable test of public benefit.”).
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touch regulations and oversight procedures employed by CICs, and
conversely CICs should capitalize on the branding advantages of social
enterprise. By gaining from each other’s strengths, CICs and benefit
corporations can prove that social enterprise actually works.
A. Recommendation 1: U.S. Benefit Corporations Should Adopt
Similar Accountability Mechanisms to CICs
As mentioned above, Etsy and Patagonia have fully capitalized on the
benefit corporation or B Corp brand to maximize their global footprints. As
a result, both companies are globally renowned as socially conscious
businesses to both consumers and employees alike. As mentioned in Part I,
one of the main flaws of U.S. benefit corporations is lack of oversight
mechanisms. Giving third parties complete discretion to provide oversight
may have worked up to this point because benefit corporations are a fairly
new corporate entity. However, as benefit corporations become more widely
accepted in the United States, allowing third parties unchecked regulatory
power can become problematic. The United States should consider using the
CIC framework as a roadmap for increased accountability.
If the U.S. government established an entity like the U.K. Office of the
Regulator of Community Interest Companies (“CIC Regulator”) that is solely
responsible for examining benefit corporations according to formal and
randomized audit procedures, the public’s faith in both benefit corporations
and third-party standards would increase substantially. Should the United
States establish a clear monitoring 91 system, it would absolve criticisms
questioning benefit corporation legitimacy. A CIC Regulator-like entity
would also increase transparency and provide consumers with specific
complaint processing procedures that outline how complaints will be
processed, who will process them, and how corporations should respond. The
CIC Regulator-equivalent should establish and facilitate such complaint
processing to ensure consistency and accountability in enforcement.
B. Recommendation 2: CICs Should Make Branding a Priority
Conversely, CICs can and should devote attention to social enterprise
branding advantages. While a large proportion of CICs currently focus on
pursuing local benefits, the Office of the CIC Regulator should educate and
encourage CICs to expand into global markets using the CIC brand. While
most CICs have seen widespread success locally, several have also been

91

See Lynch, supra note 79.
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effective in broader public sector spin-outs. 92 The CIC Regulator can
showcase such global CIC successes to motivate local CICs to consider
expanding globally. By increasing awareness of practical business
opportunities, including partnerships with other CICs (and with U.S. benefit
corporations) and entrance into profitable foreign markets, the CIC Regulator
can facilitate increased economic and social advantages for individual CICs
and their community interest goals.
V. CONCLUSION
The increased attention towards social enterprise models in the United
States and the United Kingdom suggests that both CICs and benefit
corporations are here to stay. 93 The millennial generation increasingly and
unwaveringly values social enterprise business forms as alternatives to
traditional for-profit business models. 94 As such, a thorough understanding
of these models 95 is particularly important. Not only are social enterprise
companies generating profits, but they are also gradually achieving the social
purposes and goals they had set out to accomplish in their corporate
charters. 96
Examples of successful U.S. benefit corporations and U.K. CICs have
shown that social enterprise can successfully draw from both the public and
private sectors to engage in lasting profits that will go towards worthy causes
as well as to the organizations themselves. 97 B Lab claims that there are over
92

See Analysis: The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies, supra note 52.
See REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 34 (“Interest in CICs is
continuing at pace and this is reflected in the hits that our website receives, which is an average of 11,000
per month from countries as diverse as the USA to Denmark and Moldova.”); see also id. at 43 (Key
statistics regarding CICs in the United Kingdom include the data that, in 2012–2013, there were 7,670
CICs on the public register (An increase of 20% from the year before), 2,055 filed applications to become
CICs, and 39 CICs had converted to charities.); Surowiecki, supra note 1 (As of 2014 there were “more
than a thousand B corps in the U.S. . . . and in the past four years twenty-seven states ha[d] passed laws
allowing companies to incorporate” as benefit corporations.).
94 See Westaway, supra note 36 (Westaway cites to the 2013 and 2014 Deloitte Millennials Reports
that “showed that young people believe that the number one purpose of business is to benefit society” and
that “fifty percent [of young people] want to work for a business with ethical practices.”).
95 For an examination of similar social enterprise entities in additional countries to the United States
and United Kingdom, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, see id. at 12.
96 See B Lab, Benchmark Performance, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-ab-corp/why-become-a-b-corp/benchmark-performance (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (chart compiles an
assessment of the distribution of overall B Impact Scores, showing that B Corps score higher than other
sustainable businesses who do identify as B Corps or benefit corporations); see also B Lab, B Corp
Benchmarks, B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/b-corp-benchmarks (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (explains the types of benchmark B Lab uses to assess individual businesses); see also REGULATOR
OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4.
97 John Converse Townsend, What the Private Sector Can Do For Your Social Enterprise, FORBES
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950 companies in over 30 countries and 60 industries that have become B
Lab certified as of 2014. 98 Further, B Lab asserts that, compared to “other
sustainable businesses,” B Corps are 68% more likely to donate at least 10%
of profits to charity, 47% more likely to use on-site renewable energy, and
18% more likely to use suppliers from low-income communities. 99 As of
2014, 10,000 CICs have been established in the United Kingdom, with the
number quickly approaching 11,000. 100 As shown by the cases of Bristol
Together and Blues and Beer, CICs have been an effective source of
community organizing and profit-maximization.
Incorporating as a benefit corporation in the United States offers a
business strong branding and advertising advantages under the social
enterprise brand, and at least in theory, gives shareholders the right to enforce
the company’s stated social purposes and goals. 101 Similarly, incorporating
as a CIC in the United Kingdom offers a company or group of individuals
the opportunity to utilize a formalized business structure to serve communal
goals and meet greater financial motives. 102
Interestingly, while benefit corporations and CICs serve extremely
different purposes in practice, critics of both entities share the same concern:
current oversight mechanisms are too vague to provide sufficient
accountability. Today, U.K. laws and regulations are far more detailed in
outlining processes and procedures to monitor and keep CICs accountable,
though the mechanisms are self-proclaimed “light touch” in nature. 103 While
U.S. benefit corporations are not subject to the same degree of governmental
regulation, commonly accepted third-party entities like B Lab presently
ensure adequate monitoring.
Generally, the central motivation for U.S. companies to incorporate as
benefit corporations are branding and marketing advantages, especially
under third-party labels like B Lab. Thus, while state benefit corporation
(Jan. 13, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/01/13/5843/.
98 B Lab, 2014 Annual Report, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/news-media/annualreport-2014 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). However, the reader must keep in mind that because B Lab counts
only Certified B Corps that it, as a nonprofit, approves, there are likely more benefit corporations than the
number B Lab provides.
99 B Lab, B Corp Community, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/b-corp-community
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016); see also id. (B Lab also cites that “compared to other sustainable businesses,”
B corps are also 55% more likely to cover at least some of health insurance costs for employees, 45%
more likely to give bonuses to non-executive members, and 28% more likely to have women & minorities
in management-level positions.).
100 Analysis: The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies, supra note 52.
101 Jump, supra note 86, at 154.
102 See
Community
Interest
Companies,
COMMUNITY
COMPANIES,
http://www.communitycompanies.co.uk/community-interest-companies#incorp (last visited Dec. 19,
2016).
103 REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 27–28.

171

CHO (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/7/2017 11:02 AM

37:149 (2017)

legislation does not meticulously regulate benefit corporations, branding
incentives ensure that a benefit corporation will not merely pay lip service to
its stated goals if it wants to profitably prove to the public that it is a reliable
company. Thus, while a more formalized oversight structure in legislation
would help, benefit corporations already cannot skirt accountability entirely.
Third-party standards have proved effective in ensuring that even large
corporations like Etsy made changes to increase sustainability. At least for
the time being, third-party entities like B Lab indirectly but effectively
represent public will and oversight for the companies that “capitalism-witha-conscience” 104 consumers support.
In conclusion, benefit corporations and CICs have established
themselves as successful social enterprise systems in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and globally. The two systems must learn from each
other’s strengths, particularly benefit corporation branding advantages and
CIC accountability mechanisms, in order to continually grow this success in
productive ways that give back to the corporations themselves and the
consumers they serve.

104 Christie Garton, You Must Do Good For Your Brand to Do Well with Millennials, ENTREPRENEUR
(Sep. 10, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/ 237243 (Millennials “demand a ‘participation
economy’ that allows them to contribute, co-create and shape the giving behaviors of brands they love . . .
[and] were also the first to embrace brands making a difference, consistently rewarding them with their
money and trust.”).
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